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Researchers, commentators, and politicians have devoted steadily mote attention to
infrastructure in response to claims that inadequate accumulation of public capital has contributed
to substandard U.S. economic growth. Despite this, the link between infrastructure and
productivity growth remains controversial.In this regard, it is somewhat surprising that
infrastructure research has developed in isolation from the large literature on economic growth.
We develop a neoclassical growth model that explicitly incorporates infrastructure and is
designed to provide a tractable framework within which to analyze the empirical importance of
public capital accumulation to productivity growth. We find little support for claims of a
dramatic productivity boost from increased infrastructure outlays. In a specification designed to
provide an upper bound for the influence of infrastructure, we estimate that raising the rate of
infrastructure investment would have had a negligible impact on annual productivity growth
between 1971 and 1986.
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and NBERI. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researchers, commentators, and politicians have devoted steadily more
attention to the quality, quantity and financing of infrastructure capita] in the United States.
At the heart of this debateisthe notion that infrastructure is an important input to economic
growth, with many participants in the debate attributing (at least in part) substandard United
States economic growth in recent years to inadequate accumulation of infrastructure capital.
Not surprisingly, there has also been a sharp increase in research into the economic
impact of public sector capital. In an influential study, Aschauer [1989] included public
sector capital in an aggregate production function and found that it exerted a very large
influence on private sector productivity.' (Munnell [1990b], Garcia-Mila and McGuire
[1992], and Eberts 11986. 1990] reported qualitatively similar--if smaller—findings.) More
recently, estimates. of state-level cost functions suggest that public infrastructure is a cost-
saving input for manufacturing industries (see, e.g.. Morrison and Schwartz [1992]).
However, the finding that public sector capital accumulation has been a significant drag on
U.S. productivity growth is not uncontroversial. Holtz-Ealcin [1994] and Hulten and Schwab
[1991], for example, argue that the macroeconomic impact of public sector capital on private
productivity has been small.
Concern over the pace of U. S. economic growth has motivated this line of research.
In this light, it is somewhat surprising that infrastructure research has developed in isolation
from the large literature on economic growth.2 The purpose of this paper is to take a step
toward closing this gap. In the remainder, we develop a neoclassical growth model that
explicitly incorporates infrastnicture as a component of aggregate production. Our
—1—specification is designed to provide a tractableframeworkwithin which to analyze the
empirical importance of public capital accumulation for productivity growth. Moreover,
because of the interest in the contribution of infrastructure provision to economic growth our
framework is designed to emphasize this issue, and thus provide a guide to the largest
plausible effect from this source.
Section 2 describes the basic framework, specifies the role of public capital in our
model of the economy, and describes the evolution of public capital. In Section 3, we
analyze the evolution and steady state of the economy under our assumptions. In the
following section, we use panel data for the 48 contiguous states between 1971 and 1986 to
examine the degree to which the states' growth experiences are consistent with the predictions
of our model. Focusing on the states is attractive because the results are of direct importance
to the design of state and local government policies. Also, the free flow of technology across
state borders makes the assumption of identical production technologies more tenable; the
legal setting, political institutions, and tastes do not vary greatly across states; and state data
offer the opportunity to analyze reasonably large samples collected on a consistent basis. But
state data present difficulties as well. In particular, states are open economies with relatively
free mobility of factors. Hence in our empirical work we guard against the endogeneity of
labor force growth and investment patterns that mobility potentially engenders.
To anticipate the major results, we find that even in those specifications in which
infrastructure enters the estimated production process significantly, there is little support for
claims of a dramatic productivity boost from increased infrastructure outlays. For example, in
the specification designed to provide an upper bound for the influence of infrastructure
-2-capital, we estimate an output elasticity of 0.10. However, even this estimate implies that
raising the rate of infrastructureinvestment by 10 percent wouldhave hada negligible impact
onannualproductivitygrowthbetween 1971and 1986. The final sectionis a surnmaxy,with
suggestions for further work in thisarea.
2. INFRASTRUCTURE ACCUMULATION
We follow the lead of others and specithe stockof public sector capital asa
componentof the aggregate production function.3 With aneyetoward the empiricalwork to
follow, we assume that the production function takes the form:
= K,QG,P(4IL)1 (2.1)
whereY,istotal output, K1isprivatecapital, G, ispublic capital. 4 is the physical quantity of
labor, w, is an index of technical efficiency that transforms physical units into effective units
of labor, and t denotes time periods.4 We assume that w, grows at the constant rate A, so:
= w0e At (2.2)
Similarly, 4 is assumed to grow at the constant rate . Dividing all variables by the effective
quantity of labor yields the production function in intensive form:
Yer= (2.3)
where the subscript "c' denotes quantities per effective labor unit.
Of central focus in the recent policy debate has been the fraction of resources devoted
to infrastructure investment. We summarize the propensity to invest in the public sector by
-3-9. the fraction of output devoted to publicsector capitalaccumulation, if we let 8 denote the
geometric rate of depreciation of capital, then public capital evolves according to the identity:
U,
= — 8G, (2.4)






Equation (2,6) summarizes the dynamics of public capital accumulation. In the next section,
we turn to the behavior of the economy as a whole.
3. EVOLUTION AND STEADY STATE OF THE ECONOMY•
To close the model, we must specify the accumulation of private capital. A detailed
investigation of private investment behavior is beyond the scope of this paper; there exists a
large literature that focuses on this topic alone. Our strategy is to simply control for private
sector capital accumulation, without positing a specific model of the interaction between
private investment and the evolution of public capital.5 Such an approach has both merits and
drawbacks. One advantage is that it simplifies the analysis. But it also restricts one to
analyzing the behavior of public capital and economic growth conditionaluponthe level of
-4-private capital, a drawback that precludes evaluating the degree to which public capital
enhances private investment. At the same time, nearly aM other empiricalanalysesin this
area make a similar assumption.Following thisconvention allows us to identify the extent to
which an explicitly dynamic framework affects the analysis of infrastructure, while leaving
other aspectsofthe analysis unchanged.
3.1 Characteristics of the Steady State
The long-run tendencies of the economy may be gauged by examining the steady state
of the growth model. Setting the growth rate of public capital in equation (2.6) equal to zero,
and solving for the steady state value yields:
=1 (3.1)
Tl++5
wherethe superscript *"denotessteady state levels. One can use equations (3.1) and (2.3)




Thus, thissimple approach leads one to expect that persistent, long-run differences in
thelevel of infrastructureperworkerand productivity will bedirectlyrelated to the
propensityto investinpubliccapital(6). Moreover, the closenessofthe correlationbetween
g1 and yt will be a direct function of the size of .l'hatis, setting =0in equation (3.2)
indicatesthat 6 does not affect productivity, although it continues to (in part) determine g.
-5-3.2 Characteristics of the Growth Path Toward the Steady State
It is useful to extendthe theory to developpredictions concerning the path of the
economy as it converges toward the steady state. Equation (2.6) describes the accumulation
of public sector capital on the path toward the steady state. To make clearer its implications
for economic performance, consider a log-linear approximation to the equation in the vicinity













By iterative substitution into equation (3.5), the level of public capital at time : may be
described as a point along the growth path from the initial level of public capital. g,0. toward
the steady state. That is:
-
ln(g)
=(i—(I —$y)ln(g1) +(1—$)'J.n(gd). (3.7)
-6-Re-arranging equation (3.7) yields the familiar prediction of convergence in a neoclassical
growth model:
ln(g,) —ln(g) = (i—(1—•)')(ln(g,') —In(g)). (3.8)
That is. the growth rate of public capital between t=O and =tisinversely related to the initial
level of public capital. cezerisparibus.'
Itis useful to think of as a measure of the speed by which the economy converges
to the steady state; i.e., indexing the fraction of the distance to the steady state that is
travelled each period. To gain a feel for the magnitudes, consider the time necessary to close
50 percent of the gap between the initial level of public capital and the steady state value by
evaluating equation (3.8) under the assumption that:
ln(g,) —ln(g)
=0.50(ln(g') —ln(g)). (3.9)
If population and technology each grow at 2 percent per year (i=X=0.02), depreciation is 5
percent annually (5=0.05).and13=0.05. then the implied adjustment speed is 0.086. Under
these parameter values, the time required to adjust one-half of the way to the steady state is
just under 8 years. A higher value of 13raises.thetime necessary to reach the steady state; if
[3=0.25. G=O.068 and the corresponding time is roughly 10 years.'
Our specification of the growth model deliberately emphasizes the role of
infrastructure. Indeed, in this specification the productivity of infrastructure (as measured by
[3),andthe size of 4dictatethe dynamics of the economy. Specifically, differentiating (3.8)
and using (2.3) indicates that the effect of devoting greater resources to infrastructure on
productivity growth is given by:
-.7-d(1n(y)— ln(y,))= -(1k;(g;)-' (3.10)
The larger the value of ,given0,thegreater the direct impact of public-sector capital
outlays on productivity growth. Similarly, the larger the value of $,thegreater is the effect
of increasing the infrastructure investment rate. In general, however, the effect on
productivity growth depends upon the full set of parameters in the model.
3.3 Open-Economy Considerations
The discussionthus far hastreated each state as if in isolation. In practice, however,
states are open to flows of factors of production. How do these considerations affect the
analysis? To the extent that infrastructure investment induces flows of capital and labor,
these variables will be correlated. The correlation among these variables, however, will not
biasefforts to identify theimpact of infrastmcture on productivity. However, to the extent
that high-productivitystatesattract factors, the direction of causality will be reversed, and
econometric inferences contaminated. In the empirical work that follows we attempt to gauge
the degree to which the results reflect these influences. Notice, however, that the most likely
scenario is that higher productivity permits a state to invest more in infrastructure, leading to
an upward bias. Hence, to the extent that we are unsuccessful in controlling bias due to
simultaneity, the results are likely to overstate the importance of infrastructure to productivity
growth.
-8-4. ECONOMETRICIMPLICATIONSANDTESTS
The model of infrastructureandeconomic growth developedaboveyields strong
econometric predictions. Indeed, the model predicts that the accumulation of publiccapital is
thesource of intensive economic growth, conditional upon the level of private capital.
Accordingly, differences in output or productivity are the direct consequence of differences in
policies toward infrastructure, a hypothesis that we test using data on the 48 contiguous U.S.
states. (The data are described in the Appendix.)
To do so. let i denote states. We must transform the predictions of the theory
regarding capital and output per effectivelaborunit (which are not observable) into testable







which provides a link between effective and observable quantities of public capital. In a
similar fashion, one may convert private capital and output from effective to observable units.
4.1 Steady-State Predictions
To begin, we look at the long-run tendencies predicted by the model. Taking the











a0+a1ln(e1) + a.lnOi1+?c+6)ta3ln(k,)+ . (4.3)
Acomparison of equations (4.2) and (4.3) indicates that one should expect a, anda2to be of
equalmagnitude and oppositesign. Moreover, eachserves as anestimate of (l-'. Finally.
equation (4.2) indicates that both a, and a2 should exceed Gjinabsolute value. Thus, the
regression provides a useful way to gauge the relative importance of private capital, public
capital, and labor inputs into the growth of state economies.
As a further check on the theory, notice that the production function (2.3) implies:
ln(y) =czln(k,1)ln(g1). (4.4)
which when transformed into observable units yields an equation predicting cross-state
differences in output per worker:
ln(v)L'+ b1ln(O,)+b,ln(T1+A+5)+b3ln(k)
+ . (4.5)
Againthe theory implies that b3andb2shouldbe of equal magnitude andoppositesign,
although inthis instanceitdoesnot constrain the relative size of b,.
Table 4.1 contains theresults of checkingthese predictions against data from the 48
contiguousstates for 1986.Itis not our intention to assert that the states in 1986 constitute a
sampleof steady-stateobservations. Rather,we seek aninitialcheck an the plausibility of
theframework:arecross-state differences in productivity correlated with the variables
predicted tobe of lasting importance?
Consider first the estimates in column (1). The dependent variable is the log of state
and local government infrastructure capital per member of the labor force in each state. The
-10-empirical measuresof 6 and are the average values between 1971 and 1986 ofgross
infrastructureinvestment as a fraction of Gross State Product (GSP), andthe Laborforce
growthrate, respectively.We assume that X + 8 =0.07.Private capital perworkeris based
ondata in Munnell [l990b].'°
The initial results generaJly support the model. The coefficients on 0 and (m + +
8) are correctlysigned, precisely estimated, andofcomparablesize. Indeed,it is
straightforward to constrain the coefficients in accordance with the theory; these estimates
are shown in column (2). The coefficient on the private capital variable is positive, smaller
than the coefficient on 0, and precisely estimated in both columns. Finally, the fit is
relatively good, with an adjusted 1?2over0.70. In sum, the initial pass at the data suggests
that the model provides an empirically promising description of cross-state variation in public
sector capital.
In columns (3) and (4), however, we move toward explaining productivity (OSP per
worker), and the results are decidedly less favorable. While the private capital variable
continues to have its expected sign, and is statistically significant, the remaining point
estimates are often of the wrong sign. In addition, the data reject the constraints suggested by
the theory at any significance level higher than four percent. (See the row labelled "Test" in
column (4).) Finally, the variables explain a relatively small fraction of cross-state variation
in productivity. Thus, the simple version of the theory seems relatively successful in
explaining public capital accumulation, but provides an unsatisfactory explanation of cross-
state differences in productivity."
—II—From anotherperspective,however, even the results in columns (1) and (2) do not
provide evidence that differences in infrastructure policy translate into differences in
economic performance.Incolumn (1), a, anda2each serve to estimate (j)'I,andthe
implied 's are negative. The same is true for the constrained estimates in column (2).12
Perhapsnot surprisingly, such a simple theory does not provide a powerful explanation of
productivity differences across states.
Before leaving these estimates, it is worthwhile to investigate a potential econometric
difficulty. A look at equation (4.2) reveals the presence of '4o embedded in the intercept of
equation (4.3). (The same is true of (4.5).) One might suspect that there are state-specific
characteristics --location,climate. etc. --thatgenerate permanent differences in productivity.
These differences across states manifest themselves as differences in the initial level of
productivity, In turn, these productivity differences may affect the propensity to invest in
public capital, the accumulation of private capital, and the growth rate of the labor force. In
econometric terms, the equations may be contaminated by the presence of state-specific
effects that are correlated with the right-hand side variables, raising the specter of biased and
inconsistent parameter estimates.'3
The theory itself delivers a straightforward means to circumvent this difficulty. One







Here, the theory again delivers strong predictions concerning the estimatedcoefficients,
leadingone to anticipate c, =-2 = Iand c30. The final two columns of Table 4.1 show
-12-the results of checking these predictions. In column (5), the estimates ofc, and c, are in
rough accordance with the theory. Although one may reject the hypothesis that c1 =-c, = 1,
the magnitudes are in the right bailpark and one cannot reject c1- c2. The estimate of c3,
however, is clearly very different from the predicted value of c3= ,14
As discussed in the Appendix, our measure of "infrastructure" is dictated in part by
data availability.Asa check on the sensitivity of our results to this definition, Table 4.la
shows the implications of expanding the definition of 0 to include all capital outlays by the
state and local governments in each state. Correspondingly, we define the dependent variable
to be the log of total state and local government capital per worker. Qualitatively, this
change in definition has little impact. Indeed, to the extent that there is any effect, these
results are marginally closer to the theoretical predictions.
4.2 Growth Path Predictions
The empirical analysis thus far has focused upon the long-run behavior of state
economies, as predicted by the steady-state of the growth model. As noted earlier, we may
derive a prediction concerning the movement through time of each state economy along the
path leading to its steady state (see equation (3.8)). This serves to relax the assumption that
all cross-state differences in economic variables are due to differences in their predicted
steady states. Instead, we incorporate a second source of variation: cross-differences in the
time required to reach the long-run position. These differences may stem from either of two
sources. First, the starting point -- the initial level of public capital — may be higher (or
lower) than in comparison states. If all state economies converge to the steady-state at the
- 13same rate, a higher starting point would translate directly into a greater level of public capital
per laborunit.One would not expect all states to converge at the same rate, however. As
noted above(see equation(3.6)).the adjustment speed ($) will differ due to differencesinthe
rateof labor force growth. The result is that states with a faster adjustmentprocesswill have
greater levels of public capital and output, ceterisparibus. atany point in time.
It is possible to put some econometric meat on this theoretical skeleton by converting
equation (3.8) into its observable counterpart. Specifically, using (3.8) along with (3.1) and
(4.1) yields:




Notice that equation (4.7) contains both the cross-sectional differences among states
and the time-series variation within each state. Following a similar derivation, we may obtain
an equation tracking the dynamics of output growth that stem from the accumulation of public




which may be transformed into:




The next set of estimates checks the predictions of (4.7) and (4.9) against our panel of state
data.
-14-To begin, consider column (1) of Table 4.2. which displays the results of estimating
the linear analogue to equation (4.7) using data for. 1986. The dependent variable is thelog-
difference of infrastructure capital per worker over the period 1971 to 1986. Thus, it
measures the cumulative growth rate of public capital per worker over the period. The
estimates indicate that growth rises with the average rate of investment in the public sector
(8), declines with greater capital needs (1+X+8). and increases with the amount of private
capital per worker (Ic1). Importantly, the negative coefficient on ln(g) indicates that the data
support the notion of convergence in the provision of public capital; growth is inversely
related to the initial level of capital. Each of the parameters is significant at conventional
levels.
Column(2) repeatsthe estimation exercise, using instead the cumulative growth in
productivity as the dependent variable. A comparison of equations (4.7) and (4.9) reveals the
theoretical prediction that each of the estimated coefficients should have the same sign as in
column (I), and that the coefficients on 9, and+ A+5) shouldbe smaller in absolute
value. As before, the estimated coefficients generally follow the predictions of the theory,
although the precision of the estimates is less than in column (I). The exception is the
(negative) estimated coefficient for ic. Overall, relaxing the constraints placed on the data to
permit adjustment toward the steady-state improves the performance of the model in
explaining the provision of public sector capital and the resultant level of productivity per
worker.
These estimates, however, rely only on the predicted relationship between 1986 and
1971, and thus are based on only a small fraction of the panel data. It is tempting to pool the
-15-data for all the available years as a means of exploiting all the available information in the
data. Indoingso, however, one must recognize that the "coefficient? in these regressionwill
changethrough time. For example, equation (4.7) indicates that the coefficient on ln(g,) in
any year will be (1 -(1 -J'), which changes through time. To use all the years appropriately,
then, one must impose the full set of non-linear restrictions and estimate directly the
underlying parameters of the model -- a, 13. A. and Wo• Moreover, because equations (4.7)
and (4.9) share the same underlying parameters, one may enhance the efficiency of the
estimates by estimating these equations jointly.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.2 contain the outcome of this procedure.'5 The
estimated elasticity with respect to private capital (a) is 0.32, with an estimated standard error
of only 0.01. An estimate of this magnitude is comparable to estimates of the share of capital
income in total income, and thus near conventional estimates of the elasticity of output with
respect to capital inputs. For our purposes, however, the most interesting result is the
estimated 13 of -0.04. Thus, the less restrictive specification yields the same result as the
steady state regressions in Table 4.1: the point estimate of f3 is negative and significant at
conventional levels. To complete the results, the implied estimate of the elasticity of output
with respect to labor inputs is 0.73 and the estimated growth in the technical efficiency of
labor A is 0.25 percent annually. The latter is broadly consistent with vesy slow growth in
productivity over the past two decades.
As before, it is desirable to control for the presence of unobserved state-by-state
variation in productivity levels. Here, however, the explicit use of the time dimension
permits us to adopt a different strategy for eliminating thethan used in the steady-state
-16-regressions above. We begin by explicitly parameterizing the permanent variations in
productivity across states by interacting Wo with a dichotomous variable for each state in the
sample.
As shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4.2, controlling forstate-specificdifferences
in productivity in this manner has a dramatic impact on the estimated parameters. The
estimate of a falls to 0.07, while that of f3 rises to just under 0.05. The implied value for the
elasticity with respect to labor rises to 0.88. and the estimated growth in technical efficiency,
X, rises to 0.41 percent. In each case, the precision of the estimated coefficient is good.
What should we make of these changes in the estimates? The use of state
dichotomous variables effectively identifies the remaining parameters via year-to-year
fluctuations about state-specific means. As a result, the large implied elasticity with respect
to labor inputs likely reflects the dominance of employment in short-run output fluctuations.'6
A second issue is the degree to which parameters identified in this way are subject to
simultaneity bias. Recall that factor mobility across states might lead to circumstances in
which relatively high-productivity states attract inflows of capital and labor, thus implying
reverse causation. Controlling for state effects eliminates productivity differences across
states that do not change through time. This leaves, however, the possibility that changes in
productivity over time will lead to simultaneity problems.
Reasoning in this way suggests that if simultaneity is quantitatively important in our
data, then the history of productivity in a state should improve one's ability to predict the
future path of 0 and t. That is, one should find that productivity "Ciranger-causes" these
variables. We investigate this possibility using the estimation and testing procedures
-17-developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen [19881 for vector autoregressions in panel data.
Specifically, we specify an equation for 0,, that contains a dummy variable for each year. two
lags of 0,. two lags of ii,, and two lags of y0."Theparameters are estimated using
insti-urnental variables to control for the difficulty presented by serial correlation in the error
term and the presence of lagged dependent variablesi8 We test the null hypothesis that past
changes in y,maybe excluded from the equation. The test statistic for this hypothesis,
distributed as a chi-square with 26 degrees of freedom, is only 0.42. Thus, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis of no causal relation between past changes in statest productivity and the
rate of investment. We follow a similar procedure for liAr In this instance, the test statistic.
also distributed as a chi-square with 26 degrees of freedom, is 9.7. Once more, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of no causal relation.
Thus, within the context of our empirical analysis, the data do not suggest that the
estimate of J3isplagued by a great degree of simultaneity bias. Of course, these diagnostics
do not constitute a complete investigation of factor mobility across states. For this reason, we
also examine an alternative means by which to eliminate state-effects --bysubtracting
equation (4.9) from equation (4.7). This approach has a cost, however, Ic,,iseliminated and it
is no longer possible to identify a.
Sinceis the central parameter for purposes of this study, we proceed in column (7)
to estimate the difference between these two equations. In effect,is identified by
examining the degree to which the difference between growth of infrastructure and the growth
of output is correlated with the infrastructure investment rate. The resulting parameter
-18estimate is substantially larger than in earlier columns-- roughly 0.10 — andprecisely
estimated.
As before, we check the sensitivity of these results to our definition of infrastructure
capital by re-estimating the equations using all state-local public capital. These results are
presented in Table 4.2a. In general, there are few differences in the parameter estimates.
While the point estimates differ, the qualitative nature of the results is robust with respect to
alternative measures of the inputs from the public sector. The two tables share a second
characteristic. In each case, the model does a relatively good job of explaining variations in
infrastructure capital per worker. The fit for productivity, however, is much worse. This
pattern of parameter estimates calls into question the importance of infrastructure in
explaining productivity growth.
4.3 Implications
What do the estimates imply about the productivity effects of spending on public
capital? To explore this issue, we compute the effect on productivity growth of raising the e
foreach state by 10 percent. which corresponds to about $10 billion (measured in 1982
dollars) of new spending in 1986. By differentiating equation (4.9) with respect to 0 and
evaluating using j3 =0.10and data for 1986. we compute the effect on cumulative
productivity growth.'9 As a preliminary, note that the productivity effect depends in part on
the adjustment speed. 4i. We display the estimated values in Table 4.3. The mean value of
the adjustment speed is 0.069, with a low value of 0.055 (in Pennsylvania) and a high value
of 0.096 (in Arizona). Measuring things slightly differently, the mean numbers of years
-19-required to adjust one-halfoftheway to the steady state is 9.9.Heretherangeisfrom 6.8
years in Arizona to 12.4 years in Pennsylvania.
What are the estimated productivity effects? In general, they are quite modest,
averaging 1.02 percent. Notice that these are the effects on totalproductivitygrowth over the
1970 to 1986 period, so that the effect on avenge annual productivity growth is quite small.
Even the maximum effect in the sample --1.08in Arizona --impliesa trivial impact on
annual productivity growth. Thus, even if our point estimates are evidence of a qualitatively
important role for public sector capital in the production process, they do not suggest a
quantitatively important impact on the productivity problem. Moreover, we have deliberately
chosen the parameters underlying our calculations to maximize our estimate of the impact.
5. SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper has been to assess the empirical contribution of
infrastructure accumulation to productivity growth using an explicit model of economic
growth and a panel of state data. To do so, we introduce infrastructure capital into a
neoclassical mode! of economic growth in a fashion symmetric to private capital
accumulation, and examine the empirical implications.
From the perspective of public sector capital accumulation, a robust bottom line
emerges: the data do not assign an important quantitative role in explaining the growth
patterns of states. In this respect, the results echo those of Evans and Ka.rras [1992], Holtz-
Eakin (1994] or Hulten and Schwab [1991].
-20-Using the predictionsof growth models to guide infrastructureanalyses appears tobe
apromising avenue for further research. As noted earlier, the analysis presented in this paper
controls for the level of private capital accumulation, but does not mode! the interaction
between infrastructure and investment incentives. An obvious and important extension,
therefore, is estimation of the joint evolution of output, private capital accumulation, and
infrastnicture accumulation in the context of a well-specified model. Further, in the context
of state economic growth, factor mobility is an important issue. For the purposes of this
paper, our strategy has been to employ econometric techniques designed to minimize the
influences of factor mobility on our estimates. The next step. however, is to develop a


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AIng&ny &ng Amy aing Amny bJnz
1986 Cross-Section Panel: No Fixed Effects Panel: Fixed Effects Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)












a 0.3160 0.3160 0.074610.07461
(0.01030)(0.01030) (0.02717) (0.02717)
-0.03777-0.03777 0.045650.04565 0.1032
(0.01301)(0.01301) (0.02687) (0.02687) (0.03412)




Adjusted R 0.713 0.538 0.726 0.491 0.967 0.557 0.795
N 48 48 768 768 768 768 768
See notes to Table 4]. Parameter estimates in column (3) and (4) are constrained to be equal. Also.
theestimates incolurnns(5)aad(6)areconstrainedtobeequal. Mn g.lng-lag0,Mny.lny1-lny0.
and Mn z — Mn g - Mn y.
- 24 -Table 4.2a
GrowthPathEquationil
AllState-Local Capital
A/ng ES/MY bing A/ny bing A/ny
1986Cross-Section Panel: No Fixed Effects Panel:Fixed Effects
(1) (2)
I 0















a 0.3124 0.3124 0.06727 0.06727
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.02720) (0.02720)
(3 -0.01314 -0.01314 0.02490 0.02490 0.1123
(0.01728) (0.01728) (0.02434)(0.02434) (0.03991)
X 0.004193 0.004193 0.005027(1005027 0.006170
(0.0003536) (0.0003536) (0.0003453) (0.0003453) (0.0005195)
0.02595 0.02595
(0.0006070) (0.0006070)
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.50!
See notes to Table 4.2. Parameter estimates in columns (3) and (4) are constrained to be equal. Also.
thecstimatesincolumns(5)and(6)areconstraJneotobeequal. 6lng.In-1ngØ,Oiny.Iny1-1ny0.




0.739 0.481 0.940 (1552
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Output for each state is taken from the estimates of Gross State Product (GSP)
produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The labor force for each state was
constructed from data on unemployment rates and total employment1 also from the BEA.
Productivity is defined as the ratio of output to the labor force. Real private-sector capital in
each state is taken from Munnell [1990]. The estimates of investment in infrastructureare
based on real capital investment for state and local governments from Holtz-Eakin [1993aJ.
"Infrastructure" is defined as capital devoted to streets and highways, sanitation andsewage,
and electric, gas, and water utilities, while "all capital" encompasses all capital owned by the










LaborForce Growth Rate (r) 0.0258
(0.0133)
InitialLevels (1970)
Log Output Per Worker (In Yo) -3.59
(0.193)






Output Per Worker (In y,-In Yo) 0.0493
(0.0739)





Log Private Capital Per Worker (in k) -3.66
(0.173)
-28-NOTES
1. Indeed, Aaron [1992] and HultenandSchwab [1991] argue that the impacts are
implausibly large.
2. Duffy-Deno and Eberts [1989] estimate dynamic equations to quantify the impact of
public sector capital spending. They do not, however, explicitly link their empirical
investigation to a model of economic growth.
3. See, for example, Aschauer [1989], Munnell [1990], Holtz-Eakin [1994], or Morrison
and Schwartz [1992].
4. Holtz-Eakjn[1994]finds that the data is consistent with the constant returns to scale
assumption in (2.1). Also, the results in Young [1992] argue against a specification
with increasing returns to scale in capital inputs.
5. With an eye toward factor mobility, we experimented with a specification in which the
adjustment of private capital was not costly, and capital flows instantaneously equated
the net (of taxes and depreciation) return to the marginal investment in all locations.
In this context, taxes reduce the incentive to invest, while infrastructure raises the
marginal product of private capital, and hence raises investment incentives. In
practice, however, the assumption of instantaneous adjustment appears too extreme to
capture the dynamics of state-by-state capital accumulation, leading to computational
difficulties and implausible parameter estimates.
6. Complete derivations of all results are available from the authors.
7. See Mankiw, Romer. and Weil [1992] for an investigation of the convergence
hypothesis in an international context. Holtz-Eakin [1993b] follows a similar approach
using state data.
8. In the limit, when (3 is equal to 1, $ is equal to 0. As a result, the economy does not
converge to a steady state. Instead it grows continuously at a rate directly related to
9. See below.
9. The results are not sensitive to this assumption.
10.Wethank Alicia Munnell for providing these data to us.
11.An alternative strategy for checking the long-run predictions is to use the (steady state)
condition that the private capital-output ratio is constant to eliminate k,fromthe
regressions. This approach yields results essentially the same as those in Table 4.1.
For example, in the analogue to column (1) of the table, the coefficient onO, is 0.83
and that on (;+ X + 8) is -0.61. Moreover, the data do not reject the constraints; the
constrained point estimate is 0.81 with a standard error of 0.096. As in the table,
- 29 -explaining productivity is less successful; both coefficients are of the wrong sign and
insignificant. We thank a referee for suggesting this approach.
12.Holtz-Eakin [1994] often finds point estimates of to be negative (while insignificant)
in his estimates of state production functions.
13.Holtz-Eakin [1994] emphasizes the importance of controlling for state-specific effects.
14.As above (see note 11), we estimated the differenced equation (comparable to column
(6)) imposing a constant private capital-output ratio. The estimated coefficient is 0.89
(with a standard error of 0.065),whichis close to the predicted value of 1.0. In
general, however.imposing moretheoretical structure on the cross-state regressions
does not alter our conclusion: the variables suggested by the theory are relatively
successful in explaining public capital accumulation, but unsuccessful in predicting
differences in productivity.
15.The equations were estimated using a non-linear, seemingly unrelated regressions
(SUR) technique.
16.Holtz-Eak.in [1994] reports a similar phenomenon.
17.The results are not sensitive to the lag length chosen for the vector autoregression.
18.See Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen [1988] for details. We use lags two and three of
O, rj,,and yas instrumental variables and do not constrain the coefficients of the
equation to be time-invariant.
19.In the computations, we set S= 0.05,X =0.04063,andequal to the avenge labor
forcegrowth ratebetween 1971 and 1986.
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